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Section 1: Introduction 
How to account for our perceptions of technological, environmental and health risks has been 
a focus of empirical, theoretical and philosophical inquiry within the field of risk research for 
almost 40 years. From this work we know that socio-demographic variables such as age or 
class do not consistently predict either risk perceptions, or the acceptability of nuclear risks. 
The clear exception to this rule is gender, with a longstanding finding being that male 
respondents in surveys tend to express lower levels of concern than women when asked about 
their perceptions of a range of environmental and technological hazards. This gender and risk 
perception relationship appears particularly pronounced for people’s perceptions of nuclear 
power and radioactive waste as well as other risks, for example those posed by chemicals, 
which hold the potential for local contamination (Davidson and Freudenburg 1996).  Given 
these findings it is surprising that none of the traditional accounts of nuclear ethics (e.g. Nye 
1986; Shrader-Frechette 2000) take account of the issue of gender, or the gendered nature of 
our understanding of nuclear risks.  
 
In the present chapter we explore how an account we have developed of the gendered nature 
of risk perceptions might throw light on contemporary ethical and philosophical debates 
about nuclear energy, a matter that has become of particular policy concern in the UK post-
Fukushima. Our argument is that the topic of gender and nuclear ethics is impossible to 
understand without in-depth consideration of the socio-cultural processes leading to the 
gendering of knowledge displays and epistemic subjectivity in contemporary life, alongside 
the need to address more fragmented and plural identities. In advancing these arguments, and 
in contrast to much of the established survey-based research in this field, we draw on 
theoretical and qualitative interpretive work within discursive social psychology, social 
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studies of science and technology (STS), and associated discussions of justice and care ethics 
within gender theory. This allows us to create a theoretical synthesis for approaching the 
gender-risk relationship in relation to nuclear power. We see this relationship as arising from 
cultural and identity work conducted within readily circulating discourses, and the struggles 
for recognition of differences in ethical positioning they create. Such an analysis shows that a 
better understanding of the complexly gendered nature of environmental and risk perceptions 
has an important role to play in current ethical discussions and philosophical reflections on 
nuclear energy.   
 
Section 2: UK Energy Policy and Public Risk Perceptions - the Devil’s Bargain 
The UK commissioned the World’s first commercial nuclear reactor at Calder Hall in 
Cumbria, and greatly expanded its reactor programme after the Suez Crisis in 1956 amidst 
concerns about national energy independence (Welsh 2000). This nuclear dawn proved to be 
short-lived, however, with the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl leading to 
unprecedented levels of public opposition. Rising concerns about nuclear economics also 
followed in the wake of the privatisation of the UK’s electricity supply industry in the 1990s, 
leading to an effective moratorium on the commissioning of any new nuclear capacity in 
Britain.  
 
In more recent years the debate about nuclear energy in the UK has taken a different turn, 
with the country adopting the most ambitious decarbonisation targets in the world and a 
commitment in the 2008 Climate Change Act to an 80% cut in carbon emissions by 2050. 
This constraint, alongside a lack of progress in bringing forward genuinely radical low-
carbon solutions, means that nuclear power has once more attracted policy attention, with  
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current scenarios envisaging between 16 and 75 GW of new nuclear power in Britain by 2050 
(DECC 2011).  
 
This increased attention to nuclear options has brought with it attempts to reframe the 
technology within policy discourses. Framing is one of the means by which policy domains 
become defined and rendered manageable (Jasanoff 2005). Bickerstaff et al (2008) observe 
that from about 2000 some industry representatives, senior UK politicians, and scientists had 
begun to advocate the low-carbon credentials of nuclear energy (also Teravainen, Lehtonen, 
and Martiskainen 2011). While such discourses are not particularly new (pro-nuclear interests 
in Germany had advocated them long before this; Weingart, Engels, and Pansegrau 2000), the 
increasingly urgent need to secure low carbon energy has seen them re-emerge.  
 
In seeking to explore this issue, Bickerstaff et al (2008) report that in a series of focus groups 
with members of the public in 2002 discussing both climate change and radioactive waste 
disposal, participants became more ambivalent and less antagonistic about nuclear power as 
an energy source when it was explicitly positioned alongside climate change. Nevertheless, 
few in the groups supported climate change mitigation through new nuclear build 
wholeheartedly, with participants eventually arriving at the conclusion that the nuclear option 
represented the lesser of two evils – a Devil’s Bargain in the face of the potentially greater 
risks of climate change. In effect, such support reflected only an ambivalent or ‘reluctant’ 
acceptance (see also Pidgeon, Lorenzoni, and Poortinga 2008). Furthermore, this discourse 
was accompanied by a questioning of the risk-risk trade-off implied, and a desire to explore 
other policy framings, alongside a preference for a varied and sustainable energy strategy 
incorporating investment in renewable energy and reduced demand. 
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Public acceptability of energy options, not just nuclear power, is important not only because 
in a democracy policies must remain sensitive to the views of the electorate (Pidgeon 1998), 
but also because public and interest group opposition had significantly impacted upon the 
siting processes for both power stations and radioactive waste disposal in the past (Pidgeon 
and Demski 2012). In its inquiry Energy – The Changing Climate the UK Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution concluded: “we do not believe that public opinion will permit the 
construction of new nuclear power stations unless they are part of a strategy which delivers 
radical improvements in energy efficiency and an equal opportunity for the deployment of 
other alternatives to fossil fuels” (2000, p20). The UK government stated in 2003 that, whilst 
not including proposals for the construction of new nuclear capacity, it did not exclude the 
possibility that such an option might be revisited in the future, and that this might indeed “be 
necessary” to meet the nation’s carbon targets (DTI 2003, p. 12). This statement signalled 
openly the political reframing of nuclear power as a potential component of the UK’s future 
energy strategy. This was followed 5 years later by a direct endorsement of the technology in 
A White Paper on Nuclear Power (DBER 2008) and publication of industry nominated sites 
for new nuclear stations. The stage had therefore been set for the UK to include nuclear 
power in the future generating mix.  
 
Butler, Parkhill and Pidgeon (2013) recount how the immediate policy response to the 
Fukushima Daiichi disaster in March 2011 varied in different countries: either (1) 
amplification of risk and withdrawal of policy support (e.g. in Germany, Japan, Italy and 
Sweden) or (2) a safety review, then attenuation of risk, followed by continued support (e.g. 
the UK and USA). Similarly, the impact upon public opinion has varied, with an immediate 
fall in support in many countries. However, in Britain that fall proved only temporary, such 
that by December 2011 support had returned to levels seen just prior to the accident. In other 
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countries such as Switzerland (Siegrist and Visschers 2013) and the USA (Joskow and 
Parsons 2012) attitudes also appear to have remained remarkably resistant to change. 
However, aggregate findings can obscure more subtle underlying patterns. There is evidence 
that people who formerly accepted nuclear power in the UK have now become more 
uncertain since Fukushima (Poortinga, Pidgeon, Capstick, and Aoyagi 2013), while the 
average response obscures a large and consistent gender gap (Figure 1).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The data series shown in Figure 1, routinely updated at the annual conference of the UK’s 
Nuclear Industries Association, served to ignite a policy debate about its significance. In the 
summer of 2011 the University of Birmingham Policy Commission was set up to consider 
Britain’s nuclear energy future  (Hunt 2012). In its draft chapter on public attitudes the 
Commission pointed to evidence of both the gender gap in acceptability, alongside the 
observation that women’s average self-reported knowledge about nuclear was lower than that 
of men. The initial conclusion in the draft report was that it would be helpful if the 
government could increase science education for women and girls! Having initially provided 
evidence to the Commission, the current authors had the opportunity to point out some of the 
problems with this line of argument, in that it runs the risk of reproducing the idea that men 
and women view nuclear differently simply because of some fundamental (but unexplained) 
difference between the genders. We also know that promoting greater knowledge of a 
technology or risk, the so-called ‘deficit model’ of science communication (Irwin and Wynne 
1996; Sturgis and Allum 2004), does not necessarily lead to greater public acceptance, while 
research on risk perceptions finds that levels of knowledge typically fail to explain gender 
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differences in responses (Davidson and Freudenburg 1996; Hitchcock 2001). As a result a 
more nuanced conclusion was published by the Commission in its final report: 
 
“A range of variables are important in the relationship between the public and an 
understanding of the nuclear industry, e.g. income, gender, political ideology, cultural values 
and trust in the information source. Consequently it cannot be automatically presumed that 
more information will lead to greater acceptance.” [The report goes on to conclude that...]. 
“A greater emphasis on developing an awareness of energy in schools and opening up the 
nuclear debate could help with engagement in the nuclear industry and energy generation. 
However, a better understanding of the diverse values around care, relationships, 
environmental protection and futures needs to be taken seriously.” (Hunt 2012, p. 97 
emphasis added). 
 
Section 3: Fathoming the Complexity of Risk Governance and Nuclear Ethics  
The ‘public understanding of risk programme’, as broadly framed, is testimony to the 
possibilities that exist for academics and the policy community to work collaboratively on 
matters of public concern that are subject to risk governance in modern societies. This should 
not be taken to imply that the subject of risk governance lacks controversy, or that 
investigating this will necessarily resolve the many ethical questions involved.  Real 
questions exist about opportunities for addressing the question “where do the controversial 
matters of risk governance lie?”, and the possibilities that can be brought into play for paying 
attention to questions of risk ethics. Equally, the social science community does not always 
acknowledge the intractability of the problems facing governments when contemplating hard 
choices about how we should live in the face of depleting energy resources, and potential 
imposition of new limits on societal organisation and everyday functioning (although for a 
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useful website on how such shifts are manifesting themselves to academics and other 
stakeholders involved in energy demand reduction interventions see 
www.energybiographies.org).  
 
In terms of elucidating the intractable nature of issues of risk governance, there is much to be 
gained from the environmental governmentalities field, which explores possible shifts in 
regimes or forms of governance in order to understand their specific and cumulative effects 
on ecological systems, climate change, environmental citizenship and ethics. It draws on 
literature incorporating “(s)ocial constructivist and discourse analytical perspectives on 
climate change that is capable of highlighting the extent to which climate change is a social 
product of discursive struggles rather than a naturally given problem” (Oels 2005, p185). 
Highlighting discursive struggles is important as a research strategy in that it seeks to address 
the consequences of different problem framings, as well as attending to configurations of 
state and corporate power. In so doing, interpretive practices and claims are introduced about 
the conflictual basis of environmental politics as a discursive space, and how scientific 
research too is implicated in this space.  
 
In this field, discussions of social transformation are predicated on clarity of critique and 
pursuit of interpretive claims as objects of knowledge. For example, cost benefit analysis can 
be critiqued for the way that it “obscures moral issues of equity and responsibility” and the 
emphasis on globalism for the way it “disempowers local solutions” (Oels 2005, p185), 
criticism which has also been made within the risk ethics fields (Asveld and Roeser 2009) 
and directed at the related technologies of risk assessment and analysis (see Okrent and 
Pidgeon 2000; Pidgeon and Butler 2009). We would concur that these are both important 
objects of knowledge. Our argument, however, is for further exploration of matters of 
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epistemology and ethics that are implicated in such claims. Specifically, we search for 
insights from empirical study of how gender positions and discourses lead to differences in 
perceptions of the acceptability or otherwise of nuclear technology for the production of 
energy, while considering nuclear power as one among other, related components of climate 
change and resource depletion risks.   
 
Section 4: Gendering risk: Conceptual issues  
Gender is a matter that is both difficult to fathom, and yet has to be taken fully into account 
by academic risk researchers and policy makers. A messy and complex issue (Benschop et al 
2012), it cannot be approached simplistically within research programmes that recognise 
how, as well as posing scientific questions, risk has moral, cultural, evaluative, affective and 
aesthetic dimensions (Tulloch and Lupton 2003), and that both are necessary to 
understanding matters of public concern.  Questions of identity and environmental 
controversy are of longstanding significance in the academic field of risk perceptions 
research (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Joffe 1999; Satterfield 2003; Henwood and Pidgeon 
2013) and among non-governmental organisations seeking to influence policy (Compton and 
Kasser 2009). Particularly important within risk and identity studies is the realisation that 
there are different ways of framing questions of risk (Henwood et al, 2008b). Within the 
science and society research community, extensive knowledge of risk framing has led to the 
realisation that the dictum ‘the public should be educated to understand the science’ is a route 
to impoverished risk governance practice (e.g. Rayner 2004). This realisation is testimony to 
the need for sensitivity to questions of identity, and identity related values (such as stressing 
the importance of social inclusion and acknowledging diversity), as part of the wider practice 
of public accountability in science.  
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Earlier, we noted the very extensive, well established literature on gender and risk perception, 
which has identified complex empirical effects (Davidson and Freudenburg 1996; Hitchcock 
2001). Such studies typically utilise quantitative survey methodologies to elicit judgements 
reflecting the cognitive and social psychological determinants of beliefs about risk: the so-
called ‘psychometric’ paradigm (see e.g. Pidgeon et al 1992). A frustration often expressed 
with this literature is that it fails to offer properly theorised explanations of why the observed 
relationship between gender and risk perceptions might occur.  Recently, and in response, 
attempts have begun to identify models from the risk literature for elucidating theoretical 
explanation (Wester 2012). Nonetheless, efforts to explain patterns of risk perception in 
individual (gender) difference terms continue to dominate, even in the face of little empirical 
support. Three often repeated proposals are that women might be less familiar with science 
and technology than men; that men are more concerned about their external role as economic 
providers whereas women with children are more concerned about health risks; and that 
women tend to be more distrustful of government, science and technology, something which 
is related to increased environmental concern.   
 
One explanation that does gain some empirical support, according to Davidson and 
Freudenburg, is the ‘safety concern hypothesis’: this is attributed to women’s role as 
nurturers and carers of their family unit which is extended to their local community and 
hence invokes a greater concern for both. According to Flynn, Slovic and Mertz (1994), 
observed gender ‘differences’ are due to a small group of men within their sample who hold 
much lower risk perceptions than other demographic groups, the so-called ‘white male 
effect’. This observation has been related to more general discussion of identities and societal 
vulnerability (Satterfield, Mertz and Slovic, 2004) together with questions about how to 
research diverse relationships between gender and marginality (Henwood, 2008).  
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A critical distance is taken from explaining such observed patterns in individual (gender) 
difference terms within the field of gender research, where the understandings they foster are 
typically seen as limited by simplistic interpretations. Merely observing a gender-related 
difference in a quantitative dependent measure as ipso facto saying something so obvious 
about men and women that one can report a statistically significant gap without further 
comment, and without acknowledging its implications for understanding experienced risks, 
gender norms and stereotypes, is a highly misleading interpretive practice (Hare-Mustin and 
Maracek 1990). Explaining the significance of gender does not mean automatically treating 
masculinity and femininity as different variables, of a social and/or psychological nature, that 
function as causal antecedents or effects. Rather it involves rendering problematic the 
commonplace assumptions held within particular cultures about what it is to be a woman or a 
man (Henwood, Gill, and Mclean 2002), and how this can underpin or warrant asymmetries 
in power between women and men.   
 
A related set of concerns, encompassing more of the scope of gender studies, are the wide-
ranging efforts that have been made to understand why gender apparently exerts such a 
powerful influence within society, set alongside contemporary thinking which tends to 
eschew essentialist or fixed accounts of gender ‘differences’.  Rather, researchers ask what 
empirical findings about sex and gender difference might mean, how they relate to 
controversy about men and women’s positions in society, and how they are related to 
people’s life-projects.  Such research seeks to arrive at more contextual, cultural and depth 
psychological views of masculinity and femininity as cultural binaries (e.g. Frosh 2002), 
while recognising that gender and cultural binaries can operate interpretively in ways that 
hide as much as they highlight (see e.g. MacCormick and Strathern 1992). Reflecting these 
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concerns, Gustafson (1998) has pointed out that the traditional ‘gender differences’ 
explanations of the risk and gender effect might be limited by the exclusive use of evidence 
drawn from quantitative surveys, and so has recommended a more interpretive qualitative 
approach to analysing how men and women construct understandings of risk issues.   
 
An interpretive, qualitative approach to inquiring into gender and risk perception 
 
Research practice in many fields of interpretive social science involves a more philosophical 
concern for the relevance of moral questions about risk (Roeser, Hillerbrand, Sandin, and 
Peterson 2013). One influential approach involves considering the role played by gender 
discourses and subject/identity positioning in the ways both men and women understand and 
interpret social and scientific issues in everyday life (see e.g. Fisher and Davis 1993), with a 
particular concern to avoid essentialising or fixing accounts of gender ‘differences’ 
(Henwood, Griffin, and Phoenix 1998; Wetherell 1986). In the course of studying discourse 
dynamics, people are construed as historically situated subjects whose ways of invoking and 
reworking meanings complicate the social, cultural and intergenerational transmission of 
gender and other social/identity categories (Wetherell 1996; Finn and Henwood 2009; Coltart 
and Henwood 2012). At the same time such discourse research focuses upon the ways in 
which people constantly create and claim subject or identity positions for themselves and 
others in the course of social interaction.  How identity positions are sustained or discarded as 
an emergent feature of social interchange, in ways that are accepted or disputed by others in 
that interaction, can also become a focus of study as such identity positions provide possible 
sites and means of self perception and reflection. 
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Such qualitative social psychological work is concerned with what has been called the “most 
worldly of interpretive practices” (Denzin 1997) that involve asking the types of questions 
that carry meaning in everyday life. What might empirical findings about sex and gender 
difference mean? How do they relate to men and women’s changing positions in society, and 
how is it possible to account for the pace (often slow) of cultural and psychological change? 
For Lohan (2000), working in the field of social studies of science and technology (STS) such 
social psychological sources (e.g. Segal 1997) have raised questions about how - in breaking 
down binary oppositions - spaces can be opened up to create ‘tolerance’ of gender difference 
as a form of anti-essentialist practice. Lohan invites researchers to attend to the workings of 
socio-political understandings as a means of analysing how culture and power operate to hold 
differences in place. Obvious points of connection exist between such theorising and ways of 
formulating questions, and helping to make sense of empirical findings on gender and risk. 
One example considered in our own work concerns the examination of gendered ‘moral 
voices’ (e.g. Gilligan 1982), as ways of encoding and communicating conventional 
dichotomies between women and men in perceptions of risk and its acceptability (Henwood, 
Pidgeon, and Parkhill in press).  
 
These theoretical developments articulate with the proposal by Gustafson (1998) that a more 
theoretically nuanced, interpretive qualitative approach is needed to understand gendered 
construction of risk issues. They articulate closely with a conceptually novel approach that 
we have developed to foster inquiry in the gender and risk domain, called effects made by 
gender (Henwood, Parkhill, and Pidgeon 2008), by which we mean drawing on a synthesised 
framework (that is capable of further development) for conceptualising gender within social 
and philosophical theory. We use this framework to interrogate the ways in which pervasive 
gender categories, codes and discourses define everyday realities, including the taken for 
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granted ‘truths’ of risk perception. Insights generated through this research are presented in 
section 5 of this chapter.  
 
Alongside theory from discursive social psychology, our theoretical synthesis or theoretical 
platform draws upon the work of Faulkner, in the STS field. Faulkner (2000a&b) discussed 
technology-gender relationships as social and cultural constructions, shaped by changing 
historical circumstances and socio-political processes, and functioning as regulatory 
mechanisms or norms of discourse and conduct. Faulkner places importance on the durability 
of modernist cultural associations between masculinity and technology – and especially as 
part of the conviction that social progress is attributable to technological development and its 
economic role within industrial capitalism. Faulkner argues that processes of gendering at 
play in technological work (e.g. computer software engineering) result from these 
associations, and further specific links to cultural and psychological themes of control, 
mastery and domination (also known as masculine hegemony), which together constitute 
engineering and technology as a powerful nexus of masculine culture. As part of the 
workings of this cultural nexus, regulatory ideas of gender (in)authenticity exercise people to 
show themselves to be appropriately gendered (or not) when expressing interest in, or 
associating themselves with, science and engineering domains. Faulkner sees masculine 
culture operating through such a regulatory norm of gender (in)authenticity as explaining 
women engineers’ reluctance to admit that they enjoy technology too much since it detracts 
from their female identity. Faulkner’s approach therefore sees certain forms of technology as 
culturally gendered in perception which, we argue, pertains to the gender risk effect as 
originally established in relation to large-scale technological or environmental hazards. 
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In explaining gender-culture-technology-risk relations, it matters that gendered associations 
(e.g. between large scale technology and masculinity) are symbolic positions - arising 
through the workings of tacit knowledge, expectations, thought and reflection, imaginative 
understanding, subject positioning, figurative meaning, but with individuals rarely taking up 
such a clear position in any practical context. For Jeanes (2007, p554) regarding gender as a 
norm means looking at how it “operates in social practices as an implicit (though 
occasionally explicit) standard of normalisation: a norm that is difficult to read and 
discernible most clearly in the effects it produces”.   
 
In our own analytical work, we have endeavoured to make visible such difficult to discern 
effects while taking the view that, once brought to one’s attention, they are likely to appear as 
commonsensical – even to exist everywhere. In addition to the work of discursive social 
psychologists, and Faulkner (as discussed above), our work has drawn on the feminist 
philosophical work of Scheman (1993) and her notion of epistemic subjectivity. This refers to 
taking on an identity as an authority on a subject in discourse, or conversely hesitating over 
expressing personal authority or pleasure in the activity of knowing. Scheman proposes that, 
while widely and legitimately contested within philosophy, recognisably masculine epistemic 
frameworks often remain culturally placed as the “best positions to know” (1993, p. 4). A 
relevant example in the sphere of risk knowledge is the tendency for groups exerting 
powerful influences within society to place epistemic authority in technical-rational 
approaches to understanding and managing risk problems, rather than in worldviews stressing 
practical values of responsibility and care as part of broader social and ecological 
considerations. Following Scheman’s argument, different forms of knowing may lead people 
to construct risk problems in ways that are recognisably gendered. Accordingly, this 
analytical insight provides an original strategy for investigation. Epistemic subject 
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positioning is a potentially significant issue in public evaluations of nuclear power, 
discussions of environmental/energy policy and ethics, and the gendering of risk perceptions.  
 
Section 5 Explaining the gender-risk effect: Findings from a UK study 
With the benefit of an Economic and Social Research Council supported project (Pidgeon et 
al 2007), we sought to overcome the criticisms in section 4 of explanations of the empirically 
substantiated gender-risk effect. Having developed our conceptual synthesis out of wider 
theorizing about gender, and taking a qualitative empirical approach, we conducted a 
discourse analytic study of dynamic, socio-cultural (and to some extent, deeper 
psychological) aspects of processes of epistemic and identity positioning as manifest in social 
interactions occurring among focus group members (Henwood, Pidgeon, and Parkhill in 
press).   
 
Returning to original focus group transcripts where the Devil’s Bargain frame was first 
identified in public discourse (discussed in section 2),we analysed various aspects of cultural 
and identity work in these data, which took the form of extensive discussions about 
environmental and technical risk issues. Radioactive waste[RW], nuclear power[NP] and 
climate change[CC] were the specific topics discussed in a sub-set of 4 of these groups. 
Although these topics would be expected to produce the gender-risk effect in surveys, the 
focus groups themselves were not planned with this in mind.  
 
The women and men who took part in the study were average citizens (not experts in energy 
or technology) and occupied a range of occupational and social positions. For one of the 
groups professionally qualified men and women were interviewed together, and the groups 
discussing nuclear power and climate change were all mixed gender. Sustained group 
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discussions took place over the course of two meetings of two hours on consecutive evenings. 
For many reasons, including the way focus group methodology is highly interactive for 
participants, the data took a very different form to discrete, decontextualised statements about 
who perceives the most risk as collected in surveys.  
 
In what follows, we present fragments of the gendered nature of the conversations, including 
where women engage with a technological viewpoint and men a care point of view in a non-
essentialising way. We have selected extracts of data to illustrate the interpretive analysis we 
developed in two main studied topic areas.  
 
Epistemic subjects: Positions, knowledge and risk 
A pro-technoscientific epistemic form was commonly articulated across the risk issues by 
some participants who endeavoured to speak authoritatively about science and technology. A 
number of the men in the focus groups, from early on, took up apparently authoritative and 
confident positions, as actual, aspiring, or potential knowers – as people who are interested in 
talking from a perspective of knowledge about the matters under discussion. By contrast, 
while it was far rarer among the men, the women overtly expressed doubts, hesitancies and 
uncertainties. Our analysis not only portrayed this strikingly gender differentiated pattern, but 
showed how taking an essentialist view of it belies the operation of cultural work and identity 
dynamics involved in creating and contesting power-knowledge claims and gender 
hierarchies.  
 
For example, in response to Ethan’s repeated claims that techno-scientific ways of resolving 
safety issues with radioactive waste make its management unproblematic, Elizabeth objects 
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by drawing attention to the inherent uncertainties involved when making such long-term 
claims.  
 
Ethan: “We can’t carry on just storing it at the power stations, something’s got to 
happen and they can’t make their minds up.  Why not bury it in a mine or something or salt 
mines like the Swedes do, 300 years under store.  You know, you could think about, you’ve 
got 300 years to think about it.  … they case it in glass and put it in stainless steel drums and 
put it in the salt mine … and they could still bring it out and do something else with it, when 
they know how to sort of cope with it better.  So I mean, I can’t see the problem.” 
Elizabeth: “How do they know it’s safe in 300 years? 
Ethan: “Pardon?” 
Elizabeth: “How do they know it will be safe in 300 years?” (Cromer1, RW & NP) 
 
Elizabeth’s remarks are counter-posed to Ethan’s repeated claims that techno-scientific ways 
of resolving issues with radioactive waste from nuclear power stations makes management of 
the risk unproblematic. Her remarks discredit the position he had taken up as a technocentric 
epistemic subject by pointing to the detectable flaws in his argument, and effectively shut 
down the exchange between the two conversationalists at this point in time. Overall, the 
effect of the exchange is to bring two very different kinds of epistemic position into conflict. 
What is also interesting about this (and other similar) instances of talk is the way Elizabeth’s 
position is not overpowered by the established gender pattern assuming superiority of 
technical risk and safety practices. In other examples, along with pointing out flaws in 
technocentric arguments, wit (sarcasm, irony, flippancy and ridicule; see Parkhill et al 2011) 
was another highly effective epistemic form discursively deployed by both men and women 
                                                          
1
 The names of towns where the focus groups took place appear first inside the brackets followed by acronyms 
indicating discussed topics. 
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in efforts to disallow knowledge and identity claims that seemed to activate forms of gender-
dualism.  
 
Our analysis of the data on epistemic speaking, or identity positions, points to an ingrained 
association between knowing, as a form of masculine subjectivity, and technocentrism, which 
configures a culturally recognised form of masculinity. Speaking in culturally authoritative 
ways on scientific and technological matters, may create the possibility of powerful, identity-
affirming positions in encounters if they succeed in bolstering a desired, gender authentic 
form of epistemic subjectivity: in the case of masculine subjectivity, this would be one 
connoting mastery and control. However, as we have seen, this kind of epistemic positioning 
can occasion moments when gender identities are contested in discourse-power relations, and 
where epistemic plurality is articulated and valued within displays of different forms of 
knowing.  
 
Technocentrism, responsibility and care   
The ways in which women and men often spoke differently about technology, risk and the 
environment was also considered in relation to the ways in which they constructed their ideas 
out of cultural repertoires (specific ideas, arguments, risk and value framings, subject forms) 
made available by popular, gender marked discourses of technocentrism, responsibility and 
care. At the centre of a masculine marked discourse (termed technocentrism) was the 
establishment of the modernist, world-making and risk-controlling power of technology, 
confidently articulating the value of technologies and grand technological visions operating 
across extended scales of technology, geography and time. As part of a gender binary, it was 
both distinct from, but also coexisted with, a feminine marked discourse attaching importance 
to a range of different matters such as individual and collective responsibility as a safeguard 
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against possible harm, the value of small-scale technologies and efforts at remediating the 
effects of large-scale technological risks, and generally perceiving a role for affect, morality, 
self-other connections, and a concern for future generations in everyday, societal and political 
decision making about risk.   
 
The idea of countervailing and coexisting discourses that can be gender-marked resembles 
Gilligan’s (1982) ideas about how it is possible for women and men to speak in different 
moral voices: an abstract, universalistic, voice underpinned by the application of rules, logic 
and reason (on the one hand), and a more contextual, relational and concrete/particularistic 
voice about how actions can be appropriately guided by a concern for others (known as a 
moral voice of responsibility/care) (see also Sevenhuijsen 1998).  In our study, technocentric 
and care discourses, similar in kind to Gilligan’s abstract-concrete moral voice binary, 
contributed as meaning-making resources to identity processes within the matrix of culture-
technology-identity relationships (in our terminology, creating ‘effects made by gender’; 
Henwood, Parkhill and Pidgeon, 2008). We were able to study the dynamic role played by 
discourses of care/technocentrism both with regard to the ways in which women and men 
displayed their understandings of risk in the focus group setting, and in (de)stabilising what 
might otherwise have been taken for granted as truths about the gendering of risk. Care 
discourses were evident, following a binary gender logic, when women objected to 
technological solutions to risk problems on the grounds of their epistemic failings (as too 
risky), as illustrated in the next quotation from Beth (where she is primary concerned with 
contamination from nuclear power stations, and people dying from a catastrophic accident).  
 
Beth: “Nuclear power … I just see it as being negative.  … if you hear anything about it, it’s 
either costing a lot of money or there’s waste that they’re dumping in the sea, or there’s 
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leakages, I mean you’ve just got to look at Chernobyl.  …how many were at Chernobyl?  And 
they’re still dying of cancer now.” (Norwich, Professionals, RW and NP) 
 
But, with equal conviction, technology’s use was endorsed within care discourses. This 
happened where technological possibilities and intended benefits were perceived (e.g. as 
useful for risk remediation), by taking action to modify behaviours and practices that had 
been constructed as risky. Nuclear power was talked about in this way but at this point we 
can better exemplify our argument by referring to a different technology discussed by other 
groups in this series. Genetic modification simply to improve the aesthetics or taste of a food 
gained support only very rarely from women (and also men), while its use for the purpose of 
improving nutritional content of foods was seen as beneficial, for either their own children, or 
less fortunate individuals in third-world countries. A further pattern emerged when 
technologies or behavioural change were said to be futile, and women responded vehemently 
to this by deploying discourses of responsibility and care: 
 
Olivia: “if each local authority had a target to produce their own … over the next 50 years or 
whatever, just small things like building houses with solar panels, places …wherever there is 
water and what have you to make use of …we could make one of those.  It doesn’t have to be 
a huge solution surely.” 
Christopher: “Unfortunately we’re not all blessed with having a nice fast stream going 
through the garden are we?” 
Olivia: “We’ve all got roofs that we can put solar panels in.” (Cromer, CC). 
 
According to Faulkner (2000a&b), gender dualistic discourse and positioning – in her case in 
relation to the identity work regarding notions of gender authenticity, symbolically guards 
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against threats to gender identity. Faulkner’s work is concerned with configurations linking 
masculinity with technology and with understanding engineering identities. Her work also 
promotes the idea that gender - functioning as a regulatory norm of conduct – may not fully 
explain its effects in producing highly invested (i.e. psychologically and emotionally 
committed) identity formations (also called – especially in the feminist cultural studies and 
psychosocial literatures - subjectivities). Likewise in our study, the regulatory powers of 
technocentrism, and the countervailing and coexisting notions of care, gave rise to cultural 
and identity work potentially deepening the mode of regulation of men and women’s conduct 
and subjectivities (Masco 2006).  
 
Our study was concerned with people talking about technical, environmental and social risk 
issues in everyday life, not in an occupational setting such as engineering or nuclear 
industries, and we witnessed instances of increasingly invested, or emotively charged, 
conflictual encounters which seemed to be related to a perceived erosion of boundaries 
between technological and care as valued speaking/identity positions and epistemic forms of 
knowing.  In such instances, there did seem to be a possible identity protective role for 
participants in the way they spoke or reacted to the epistemic speaking positions taken up by 
others in connection with the importance, or otherwise, of practices of technological world-
making and risk-taking culture. Sometimes this took the form of distancing oneself from 
hubristic, hegemonic forms of masculine identity. For example, Joshua seems to distance 
himself from such a position when alluding to human beings as the “second plague” because 
of their dominance and responsibility for harming the planet.  
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Joshua: “You [moderator] asked who was the planet for.  Is it for humans, or is there a 
bigger meaning?  So perhaps what’s wrong with the planet is the humans.  Get rid of all the 
humans.” 
Abigail: “And then it will be alright.” 
Joshua: “And then it will be alright.” 
Jacob: “Where will I be?  [Laughs]” 
Joshua: “Well I suppose if I have to sacrifice myself I think to save the whole Earth 
[laughs].”  “We’re the second plague aren’t we?  That’s one way to look at it.” (Heysham, 
CC). 
 
Our observations suggest that enjoyment of hegemonic cultural forms of masculinity as part 
of identity formation within the social, political and economic institutions of late modern 
societies (as emphasised by Faulkner) can be a complex phenomenon. Regarding the study of 
gender and the perceptions of risk, its significance may lie in opening up the possibility that 
gendered, binary thinking rests on a contestable value base, and that when displayed it is part 
of the struggles for recognition that take place within gendered discourse.  
 
Section 6: Gender, risk and policy making: a question of nuclear energy or nuclear 
ethics? 
In keeping with the orientation of the present volume, the arguments advanced in this chapter 
can revitalise and strengthen ethical analysis of nuclear issues in the C21 where diverse 
identities, interests, aspirations and conflict dynamics bear upon risk, energy and 
environmental decisions and policy.  Hansson (2012) stresses that a variety of approaches are 
needed for approaching normative risk assessments in such contexts. Some seek to establish 
new philosophical principles for analysing the continuing deployment of nuclear technology, 
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for example, strengthening the no harm duty and balancing obligations to future generations 
with contemporary social interests (Taebi 2011; Taebi, Roeser, and van de Poel 2012). Doyle 
(2010) has initiated mapping ethical landscapes by highlighting morally justified differences 
of motivation and conflicting obligations at different levels of ethical analysis. But this is 
methodologically complex work involving studying how ethical disagreements about nuclear 
issues emerge in particular contexts, and discussing their significance in policy and public 
realms. The present chapter, by developing theoretical understanding of the gender-risk 
relationship in everyday settings, and presenting empirically informed and enriched ethical 
analysis, starts to elucidate such methodologically complex work.  
 
Our findings concern when, why and how the empirical gender-risk effect was reproduced in 
group discussions, as a means of fathoming the complexity of gender and risk. The approach 
taken in the study involved considering discursive struggles over epistemic values and 
identity (or subject) positioning. A number of matters of controversy emerged in the groups 
relating to the way different epistemic positions came into play, resulting in a patterning of 
discourse response around conflicting arguments. Epistemic diversity was mobilised as one 
among other discursively articulated values and spoken identity positions. Analysis focussed 
upon occasions where technoscience and care ethics were discussed and, from other less 
culturally archetypal and recognisable kinds of values, we have started to introduce the 
importance of mutual recognition (see also Benjamin 1988). This patterning of talk would be 
expected in contexts where democratic values, attaching importance to disparate voices, 
come into play. In this sense, what our analyses have shown is not remarkable. But there are 
important implications when such values are part of discussions about things that matter to 
people (Sayers 2011), and where the epistemic and other value positions in question are 
connected to matters of wider policy relevance (Pidgeon 1998). Of particular concern to us in 
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this chapter are effects that are made – or mobilised - when different issue framings linking to 
matters of gender are heard to communicate attenuated or amplified perceptions of risk. Our 
reported findings suggest that, while in certain contexts prevalent forms of knowledge and 
values may appear as legitimate or dominant, they may appear in others to be opportunistic, 
supporting one particular group or set of subjective interests, in the thrall of identity 
dynamics, and thus unlikely to work in an appropriately motivated fashion for a diverse 
populace or for the collective good. This ‘effect made by gender’ applies equally to care 
values and technoscientific ones, suggesting that matters of energy and risk policy are not 
best approached within either of these frames singly. 
 
A wider issue to which our inquiries speak is what gets omitted from discussions of 
technology, energy policy, and environmental futures, when and why.  Buck, Gammon and 
Preston (2013), considering the implications of ecofeminism for geo-engineering, have 
problematised the use of gendered metaphors and discourse in science and policy, and lack of 
consideration for those who need to be concerned about risk effects either because they are 
more likely to be vulnerable to them or benefit less from risk adaptation measures. Our own 
analyses of gendering processes in risk perception likewise engage with some of the same 
science metaphors (e.g. hubristic attitudes to nuclear power), showing how they can bolster 
the durable association between masculinity and technology as part of historically 
constructed realities. However, our study also brings to light epistemic and identity processes 
by which such associations are re-invoked, re-imagined and reworked in everyday talk - 
exploring, in particular, how the deepening hold of gender as a form of culturally ingrained 
and fluid subjectivity holds out different possible interpretations of this long-established 
cultural association. One way in which our study closely aligns with conclusions drawn by 
Buck et al is in cautioning against adopting a fundamentally technocratic approach to creating 
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large-scale system wide interventions for guiding energy transitions and environmental risk 
management. Alternative, soft energy pathways are capable of avoiding unnecessarily (Parisi 
1977) and thoughtlessly (Buck et al 2013) going down risky and uncertain pathways.  
 
Nuclear energy – as we have argued– is not a fixed object of knowledge, but diversely 
framed over time. Questions of nuclear risk have loomed large in the landscape of public 
perceptions at certain time periods (e.g. the Cold War), and are awakened in response to 
everyday incidents prompting awareness of hazards (Parkhill et al 2010), but they do not 
currently figure in UK nuclear energy frames. Rather, the technology’s future role  is being 
determined through its connection with securing energy in the immediate and long term for 
the population at large, along with achieving decarbonisation targets. Moreover, a clear 
commitment remains in UK policy discourse that public understandings of environmental and 
technological risk issues, including risks associated with nuclear technology for the purpose 
of energy production, are trumped by the objective science of risk should they diverge from 
it. So it is here where it makes good sense to bring in the gender-risk conundrum from the 
shadows to centre stage. Buck et al (2013) argue for the need to entertain support for a risky 
technology all the time it has possible merit in a resource limited and carbon emissions 
threatened world. They also cover what a concern for gender dimensions can bring to the 
foreground when “what gets attention” in policy and public awareness are technologically 
advanced, bold and risky methods, at the expense of gentler, more natural solutions with 
fewer uncertainties and known risk. This raises the question ‘how can gender enhance 
scientific, technological and risk discourse, and not simply reject such research, in order to 
consider its possibilities for remediating harm?’ Part of the answer is that such discourse 
needs to change to avoid a gender insensitive research trajectory. Our own research 
contributes to thinking through how public energy discourses risk gender insensitivity.  
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Figure 1: British Public Views on Replacement of Nuclear Power Station (source Ipsos-
MORI, Nuclear Industries Association)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
